Modernizing the Right Way: Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept 

             The last phase uses Taiwan’s reserve force to launch guerilla hit-and-run attacks on Chinese forces. Taiwan’s geography is perfect for such operations, where its forces can attack, then hide in cities or mountains. Currently, the plan is to use the reserve force alongside the regular army as an armored unit. However, Adm. Lee believes they are better suited working independently, as small and mobile guerrilla units. Using reservists as mobile hit-and-run forces would be the best use of them. Ukraine has made extensive use of guerrilla fighters, both those operating under the military and those operating on their own accord, attacking combat and logistical units as well as Russian civilian leadership. Using these guerilla tactics would have three benefits. First, these forces could defeat a Chinese invading force on their own, before outside powers have to come to their aid. These reservists, operating in conjunction with the regular army, could lead to the latter winning major battlefield victories against invading Chinese forces and cause them to retreat from the island altogether. Second, in the event of a takeover of Taiwan by China, the reservist army could continue fighting even after the regular army has ceased to be an effective force. Although such operations are easier said than done, hit-and-run attacks against Chinese forces could prove a thorn in the side of the occupiers. These attacks would surely cause Taiwanese civilians to join the fight in their own way, as was shown in Ukraine, and by tying down both forces in hunting down these groups, make it easier for the U.S. to come to Taiwan’s aid and liberate the island. Taiwanese citizens, on their own accord, have begun to prepare to defend themselves, and underground guerrilla operations have a track record of being a force multiplier for foreign liberators. Finally, by maintaining the fight even after the regular army has been defeated, it's more likely that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s aid. By maintaining an image of a people who refuse to give in to China, American public support will force the U.S. to do something.

             Adm. Lee does recognize the need for such conventional capabilities to combat gray zone incursions, but he argues that the majority of the defense budget should go to asymmetric systems vital to Taiwan’s defense against a  Chinese invasion. Some, like anti-ship missiles mounted on ships and on land, may be critical for both low-intensity and high-intensity confrontations with the mainland. However, Taiwan must balance its two missions:confronting incursions over its airspace and defeating  a full-scale invasion of the island. These two missions require different weapon systems, forcing Taiwan to prioritize one. Given that an invasion of Taiwan is a more existential risk, Adm. Lee's ODC  prioritizes asymmetric capabilities. However, the Taiwanese defense establishment disagrees, instead putting the budget towards capabilities to counter gray zone incursions.